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Abstract. The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) provided a mandate to negotiate 
a new climate agreement by 2015, entering into force from 2020. This chapter examines the 
legal form and principles of a new agreement. It is argued that the ADP allows states to 
choose between distinctive options, including the adoption of a new protocol, amendment to 
the UNFCCC, or a combination including decisions by the Conference of the Parties (COP). 
The legal form of each of the elements of the agreement must also be assessed. Finally, it is 
necessary to overcome the binary distinction between the commitments of developed and 
developing states, and establish a more differentiated and dynamic architecture. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In 2011 it was agreed to launch a new Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action (ADP) with a mandate ‘to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an 
agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.’ The new 
negotiating process, which began in May 2012, is scheduled to end by 2015. The outcome 
should come into effect and be implemented from 2020 onwards. However, while the door is 
pushed open for formal discussion on questions of legal form, the choice of form is far from 
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settled. The formulation in the ADP decision from Durban is marked by constructive 
ambiguity and requires further interpretation.  
 
 The negotiations of the new climate agreement are also marked by confrontations 
about its substantive content, not least about how the principle of ‘common, but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’ should be incorporated in the future agreement. 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are based on a clear distinction between developed and 
developing states (Annex I and non-Annex I states). But the basis for this distinction is 
increasingly becoming blurred by changing economic realities and steeper greenhouse gas 
emission trends in advanced economies. Accordingly, there is a need to rethink how 
differentiation in responsibilities should be reflected in a new climate agreement. 
 
 Furthermore, the connection between the legal form and the substantive content should 
be examined. The Durban Platform commits states to negotiate an agreement with a legal 
status. But this does not necessarily mean that the elements of such an agreement need to be 
legally binding. It is therefore of interest to discuss which of the elements that should be of a 
legally binding character, including whether differentiations between states may include the 
binding nature of their commitments.  
 
 This chapter begins with a discussion of the interpretation of the terminology in the 
Durban Platform on the legal character of a climate agreement. In the next section we deal 
with the benefits of a legally binding agreement, with a particular focus on the binding 
character of the different elements of the agreement. Then, we examine different approaches 
to differentiation between states in the agreement. Finally, we draw some conclusions about 
the substantive content and legal form of a future climate agreement. 
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2. The Durban Platform of Enhanced Action (ADP)1  
 
Discussions on legal form of a new agreement have weighed on the UNFCCC negotiation 
process for several years. The 2007 Bali Action Plan2 set up the Ad-Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) with the purpose of reaching an ‘agreed 
outcome’ on long-term cooperative action on climate change in 2009. The term ‘agreed 
outcome’, however, does not provide clarity on the legal form or character of the outcome this 
process should produce, nor did the Bali decision contain a clear mandate to negotiate the 
legal character of such outcome. Since the Bali Action Plan, many Parties have repeatedly 
expressed their view that such outcome needs to be of legally binding character. Several 
Parties submitted proposals for various legally binding instruments under FCCC Article 17. 
These included different types of protocols from Australia,3 Japan,4 Grenada5, Tuvalu,6 and 
Costa Rica7 and an Implementing Agreement from the United States.8  
 
 Decision 1/CP.17 limits the choice of legal form of a new climate agreement to three 
options: a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the 
                                           
1  The following paragraphs draw upon: Christina Voigt (2012): The Legal Form of the Durban Platform 
Agreement: Seven Reasons for a Protocol, 15:3 Ethics, Policy & Environment, 276-282. 
2 Decision 2/CP.13. 
3 Draft protocol to the Convention prepared by the Government of Australia for adoption at the fifteenth session 
of the Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/2009/5 (6 June 2009). 
4 Draft protocol to the Convention prepared by the Government of Japan for adoption at the fifteenth session of 
the Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/2009/3 (13 May 2009).  
5  Proposed protocol to the Convention submitted by Grenada for adoption at the sixteenth session of the 
Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/2010/3 (2 June 2010).  
6 Draft protocol to the Convention presented by the Government of Tuvalu under Article 17 of the Convention, 
FCCC/CP/2009/4 (5 June 2009). 
7 Draft protocol to the Convention prepared by the Government of Costa Rica for adoption at the fifteenth 
session of the Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/2009/6 (8 June 2009).  
8 Draft implementing agreement under the Convention prepared by the Government of the United States of 
America for adoption at the fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties, Note by the secretariat, 
FCCC/CP/2009/7 (6 June 2009).   
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convention. Except for setting up these alternatives, the decision is silent on the legal 
character of that agreement, notably in the absence of the term “legally-binding”. 
 
 A preliminary question is whether the qualifier “under the Convention” shall apply to 
all three options.9 If answered in the affirmative, the qualifier excludes tracks separate from 
the convention, such as purely domestic or regional arrangements and laws.  
 
 Option 1 then reads to be “a protocol… under the Convention” and pertains to a 
protocol according to Article 17 UNFCCC. Option 2 is less straightforward. It would read as 
“another legal instrument … under the Convention”. Legal instruments under the Convention 
could refer to any of the legally binding instruments which the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) has the competence to adopt. These are - in addition to protocols - amendments 
(Article 15), annexes (Article 16) and amendments to annexes (Article 16). However, the 
COP may also adopt decisions. The majority view is that COP decisions are generally 
political in character and not legally binding. Legal bindingness may, however, be achieved in 
the exceptional circumstance that an explicit mandate by the treaty that establishes the COP 
(the Convention) empowers the COP to “regulate” or “legislate” through decisions. The 
Convention does not contain an explicit ‘regulatory mandate’ for the COP. 10 This does not 
necessarily mean that COP decisions are devoid of legal effects. The decisions may have 
significance for the interpretation of substantive obligations of the states parties. They may 
also be binding at the internal level, for example decisions about the establishment of 
                                           
9 The issue of the legal form of a new agreement ‘under the convention’ is separate from the question whether all 
principles and provisions of the convention should equally apply to that agreement. The latter question is not 
discussed here. 
10 The UNFCCC only empowers the COP to “make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the 
effective implementation of the Convention” and to “exercise such other functions as are required for the 
achievement of the objective of the Convention”. Article 7.2 UNFCCC. 
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subsidiary bodies or the adoption of rules of procedure. 11 In the absence of an amendment to 
the Convention or a new protocol authorizing the COP to adopt binding decisions it is, 
however, difficult to see COP decisions as a relevant ‘legal instrument(s)’.12 
 
 The third option is the least clear. The formulation “an agreed outcome with legal 
force under the convention” uses language which does not appear in the Convention. It has 
been suggested that this option “seems to be designed to allow room for the negotiations to 
end with an outcome that doesn’t take the form of the legal instruments expressively 
contemplated in the Convention, and yet is still ‘under the Convention’.”13  
 
 The term ‘agreed outcome with legal force’ is considered to be a more ambiguous 
option than the first two. This option conceivably gives more room for maneuver in 
negotiating the new climate agreement as it does not limit the result to one instrument. Rather, 
there could be a package of instruments including perhaps several COP decisions as well as a 
protocol/-s. 
 
 The ambiguity in the formulation ‘agreed outcome with legal force’ raises the same 
question as pertains to ‘legal instrument’, namely whether a non-binding COP decision could 
qualify as such ‘outcome’. An ‘agreed outcome with legal force’ may well include COP 
decisions, but not as the sole result. Rather, one (or more) protocol(s) would need to be part of 
that package. The ‘agreed outcome’ could, for example, consist of (i) a protocol which in turn 
                                           
11 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: A Little noticed Phenomenon in International Law, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
94, No. 4, October 2000, 623-660, 634. 
12 As mentioned above, many states made clear the need for a legally binding agreement. As one climate expert 
noted: “Given the gathering momentum towards a legally binding instrument in the lead-up to the Durban 
Climate Conference, it would be safe to assume that the majority of countries that negotiated the Durban 
Platform, however, did not intend this [to consider COP decisions ‘legal instruments’] to be the case.” See 
Lavanja Rajamani, The Durban platform for enhanced action and the future of the climate regime, 61:2 
International Comparative Law Quarterly, 2012, 506. 
13 J Werksman, Q&A: The Legal Aspects of the Durban Platform Text, WRI Insights, 14 December, 2011. 
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empowers the COP or its governing body to “regulate through decisions” similar to article 17 
of the Kyoto Protocol which instructs the COP to “define the relevant principles, modalities, 
rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions 
trading”, (ii) the decisions taken under that mandate and (iii) of aspirational decisions with a 
lesser degree of stringency and specificity. 
 
 Meanwhile, the possibility has been contemplated that ‘an agreed outcome with legal 
force’ could also be interpreted as legal instruments embodied in domestic, rather than 
international law.14 Such ‘bottom-up’ legal construction is reminiscent of an ‘implementing 
agreement’ that allows for ‘legally binding approaches’ based on Parties’ municipal law.15 
This view, however, is difficult to maintain. The qualifying term “under the Convention” 
limits the range of options to those entailed in that international legal instrument, i.e. 
protocols, amendments and annexes. The difference to options 1 and 2, which envisage single 
instruments, lies in the fact that option 3 allows for the combination of a number of different 
instruments in a ‘package solution’ as explained above and thereby creates greater 
flexibility.16  
 
 Finally, Decision 1/CP.17 instructs the ADP to complete its work no later than 2015 in 
order to adopt a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force at 
                                           
14 Rajamani, 2012, 507. Daniel Bodansky, The Durban Platform Negotiations: Goal and Options, Harvard 
Project on Climate Agreements, Viewpoint, June 2012, 3 and Daniel Bodansky, The Durban Platform: Issues 
and Options for a 2015 Agreement, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, December 2012. 
15 Rajamani, 2012, 507. See also India’s submission to the ADP, where it is noted that “an agreed outcome with 
legal force’ needs not have the legal form of a protocol or a legal instrument; it could be an outcome that derives 
legal force from municipal or international law.” Indian Submission on ADP Work Plan, 
FCCC/ADP/2012/Misc.3, 30 April 2012, 33. 
16  Moreover, a solution based on domestic climate laws may not satisfy the requirements of universal 
applicability required by Decision 1/CP.17. In order to be ‘applicable to all Parties’, the outcome must adhere to 
a certain degree of consistency and coherence in form and character, even if not in substance. This element pays 
respect to the insistence of the US and others on legal symmetry. Universality of application, thus, prevents a 
solution based on (many different) domestic instruments. This argument is further supported by the need to 
strengthen “the multilateral, rules-based regime under the Convention” as expressed in the third paragraph of the 
Preamble to Decision 1/CP.17.  
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COP 21 and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020. COP-decisions do not 
need to “come into effect”. On the other hand, legally binding instruments such as a protocol, 
would require certain domestic legislative processes to take place before they can enter into 
force and come into effect.  The time gap of 5 years indicates that there is a difference 
between ‘adoption’, ‘coming into effect’ and ‘implementation’ of the new climate agreement. 
In other words, the time frame indicates the necessity of a lengthy process for the ‘evolution’ 
from adoption to implementation, reminiscent of a ratification process of an international 
agreement. Such procedural time-window would neither be necessary for purely domestic 
solutions, nor for decisions of the COP. Rather, the generous timeframe provides yet another 
interpretative argument for the legally binding possibilities under the UNFCCC. 
 
3. Which elements should be legally binding?  
 
3.1. Introduction 
There is no necessary connection between a legally binding instrument and the binding status 
of each of the elements of such an instrument. While the instrument can be of legally binding 
nature, its provisions need not be binding.17 
 
 One example is the emissions reduction commitment in article 4(2) of the UNFCCC. 
This provision is part of a binding instrument, but is arguably not a legally binding 
obligation.18 Being part of a binding legal instruments means that also this provision is subject 
to the accepted principles of treaty interpretation, as reflected in articles 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). Furthermore, violation of a binding legal 
                                           
17 D Bodansky, The Durban Platform: Issues and Options for a 2015 Agreement (Center for Climate and Energy 
Solutions. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2270336,Published, 2012), 3. 
18 D Bodansky,  'The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 'Yale Journal 
of International Law 18, 1993, 451-558, 516. 
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instrument may entail stronger political condemnation. i.e. a heightened ‘shaming factor’. 
Elements of a legally binding instrument may also more likely be implemented in national 
legislation.19 But its breach will have no legal consequences at the international level.  
 
 In the following a functional approach will be applied. It will be asked which elements 
of a legally binding instrument should, in light of the international legal consequences, have a 
legally binding character. But it will also be examined whether such elements should be 
contained in the legal instrument itself, or be delegated to subsequent decisions by the COP. 
 
3.2 The legal character of different elements 
The legal consequences of including elements of a binding character may be different, 
dependent of the character of the rule. For example, binding procedural rules may delegate 
powers to the COP to adopt legally binding – as opposed to political (‘soft law’) – decisions. 
While legally binding substantive obligations, such as emissions reduction commitments, 
may, in cases of violation, have legal consequences as defined in the relevant instrument, 
possibly including sanctions. They may also entitle other states parties to take legal action, 
such as countermeasures, under general international law. The different legal consequences 
will be discussed in relation to the pertinent elements of the legal instrument. 
 
3.2.1. Objectives and principles 
The objectives and principles for cooperation may be contained either in the preamble or in 
the articles – the operative provisions – of a legal instrument. While the preambular 
provisions are not binding as such, the operative provisions are at the outset binding.  
 
                                           
19 D Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press, 2010), 179. 
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 However, the objectives and principles are by nature not immediately operational – 
they are meant to serve as a background for the operative provisions. They may be used in the 
interpretation of the operative provisions and serve as guidance in establishing the powers of 
the COP and other institutional organs. Decisions taken by the COP and other organs may 
even be considered invalid cooperation (ultra vires) if they contradict the objectives and 
principles for the cooperation. Whether such objectives and principles are contained in the 
preamble or in the operative provisions will not necessarily make much legal difference. But 
their inclusion in the operative provisions may give them a stronger political status. 
 
3.2.2. Emissions reductions and limitations 
Emissions reductions and limitations of greenhouse gases are at the core of a new climate 
agreement. The need for binding legal obligations depends on their strictness. But if the 2oC 
(or even 1,5oC) goal shall be reached, strict obligations would be required. In such case, the 
burdens on states would be significant and the temptation to circumvent – acting as a ‘free 
rider’ – would increase correspondingly. Both the need for national implementation and the 
‘shaming factor’ in case of violation would speak in favour of internationally binding 
emissions reductions and limitations. But are legally binding obligations desirable due to the 
legal consequences of violations? 
 
 In principle, it would not be necessary to have legally binding emissions reductions 
and limitations in order to impose binding consequences, such as sanctions, under a climate 
agreement (see 3.2.5. below). Such legally binding consequences can be established on any 
factual or legal basis as defined by the states parties in the agreement. But states would hardly 
impose legally binding consequences for violations of political (soft law) commitments. 
Furthermore, the legal status may be of importance for allocation of benefits under the climate 
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agreement, whether it pertains to rights to trade in quotas (see 3.2.3. below), receipt of 
economic or technological incentives (see 3.2.4. below) or representation by the relevant state 
party on elected subsidiary organs. 
 
 The use of legally binding emissions reductions and limitations would also allow 
states to apply general international law in the form of countermeasures and state 
responsibility against states that do not respect their obligations. Moreover, they may take 
them to available international courts outside the climate regime, such as the International 
Court of Justice. While other states usually will be reluctant to take such actions, they should 
not be ruled out. The whaling case brought by Australia and New Zealand against Japan is an 
example of states taking court action to enforce a multilateral regime for living resources.20  
 
 The use of legally binding commitments may also be of significance with respect to 
other international obligations. The international legal system is increasingly fragmented in 
terms of diverse regulations in different legal regime, such as trade, human rights and the 
environment. It may be of importance that the commitments under the climate regime are 
legally binding in order to prevail in relation to other treaties, such as the international trade 
regime.21 
 
3.2.3. Trade in emission quotas and other flexibility measures 
A new climate agreement may contain different kinds of ‘flexibility mechanisms’, from 
trading in emissions quotas to, say, different forms of credits for investment in environment-
friendly technologies in other states, reforestation or reduced emissions from the forest or 
                                           
20 ICJ, Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan) Application (2010), Application instituting proceedings 31 
May 2010. 
21 J Werksman, 'Compliance and the Use of Trade Measures' in J Brunnée, M Doelle and L Rajamani (eds), 
Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (CUP, 2012)  262-286 
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other sectors. Such measures may need a legally binding form in order to ensure effective 
transactions between the involved states. But a legally binding form is also essential for the 
connection with substantive obligations concerning emissions reductions and limitations. It is 
difficult to imagine that states should be credited with such transactions in relation to legally 
binding emissions reductions and limitations unless also the transactions have a binding legal 
basis.  
 
3.2.4. Financial transfer and transfer of technology 
Massive economic and technological support is necessary if the 2oC goal (or the 1,5oC goal) 
shall be reached. Financial commitments and transfer of technology by developed states 
would be part of a package deal.  
 
 Such arrangements may take the form of being conditions for implementation of 
commitments by developing states, as is arguably the case of Article 4.7 UNFCCC.22  This 
would mean that non-fulfilment of the commitments would have legal consequences in the 
form of suspension of the substantive obligations by developing states. But, first, there may be 
a need to strengthen the obligations of the developed states through establishing them as 
unqualified legal obligations, i.e. not only as having the consequence of suspending the 
obligations of developing states. Furthermore, a legally binding status may be desirable in 
order to apply legal consequences in cases of violations (see next subsection). 
 
3.2.5. Non-compliance procedures, including incentives and sanctions 
The legal status of the enforcement measures adopted by the Compliance Committee of the 
Kyoto Protocol has been disputed. Article 18 of the Protocol establishes that ‘any procedures 
                                           
22 L Rajamani, 'Developing Countries and Compliance in the Climate Regime', ibid, 383. 
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and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by means 
of amendment to this Protocol’. It may thus be argued that none of the consequences adopted 
by the Committee are binding in the absence of such amendment.23 
 
 Incentives should obviously be part of a compliance regime. But it would generally 
seem that stricter commitments would require use of binding legal sanctions as a means to 
prevent ‘free riders’.24   
 
 The need for legally binding consequences should, however, be assessed in relation to 
the character of the substantive commitments and of the relevant consequences. For example, 
it may be asked whether legally binding sanctions should be applied both in relation to 
violations of substantive obligations and to commitments to provide financial and 
technological resources. Furthermore, the consequences may be diverse, spanning from a duty 
to provide a plan on how to bring about compliance to the imposition of financial penalties. 
The decisive criterion for establishing legally binding consequences should be the need for 
establishing the sanctions as a separate legal obligation on the relevant states – in addition to 
the obligations taken on as part of the climate agreement as such. 
 
 It should also be mentioned that a competence to adopt legally binding consequences, 
including sanctions, may have repercussions on the institutional features and procedures of 
the organs dealing with such issues. First, it should be assured that such organs are credible in 
terms of assessing both relevant facts and legal commitments. Moreover, the imposition of 
legally binding consequences should only occur if relevant due process guarantees are 
                                           
23 G Ulfstein and J Werksman, 'The Kyoto Compliance System: Towards Hard Enforcement' in OS Stokke, J 
Hovi and G Ulfstein (eds), Implementing the Climate Regime. International Compliance (Earthscan, 2005) , 57-
58. 
24 D Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, 236-237. 
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respected. This may speak in favour of also establishing the organs and their procedures in a 
legally binding form. 
 
3.3 Regulations in the agreement vs delegation to the COP 
The establishment of an institutional framework in the form of a COP and possible other 
organs is key to ensuring a dynamic cooperation and developing the substantive commitments 
over time – possible all the way to 2050. The Marrakesh Accords is a good example of wide-
reaching decision-making by the COP serving as the meting of the Parties (CMP). 
 
 It is necessary to balance which substantive obligations should be contained in the 
agreement itself and what could be delegated to decisions by the COP. But to the extent that 
binding legal regulations through COP decisions are needed, the delegation of powers to the 
COP must be contained in legal provisions in the agreement.  
 
 The procedures for decision-making could be left to subsequent adoption by the COP 
as Rules of Procedure. But such delegation to the COP may, in the absence of consensus, 
prevent their adoption – as we have seen under the UNFCCC.25 It might also be that a more 
sophisticated system for decision-making should be adopted as part of a climate agreement. 
Different procedures could be developed for different kinds of decisions. For example, new 
substantive commitments could require consensus (but not formal amendment and a 
ratification procedure). Other decisions, e.g. on trading and other flexibility mechanisms, 
could require forms of qualified majority. This could be combined with systems of weighted 
voting. The Enforcement Branch of the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance Committee provides an 
example by its membership from Annex I and non-Annex I countries, regional representation 
                                           
25 In the absence of formally adopted rules of procedure, the Climate Change Convention applies draft rules 
contained  in UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/2. Draft Rule 42 on majority voting, however, is not applied. See Report 
of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifth Session, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1999/6, paragraph 14. 
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as well as Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and its requirement of three-quarters 
majority, including a majority among both Annex I and non-Annex I countries..  
 
 In short, a future climate agreement raises not only the question about its legal form, 
but also the legally binding character of its elements. Furthermore, the consequences of 
violations of such binding elements must be determined. Finally, a choice must be made 
between which elements should be included in the agreement itself and what can be delegated 
to decision-making by the COP.   
 
4. Equity and Differentiation  
 
The success of the negotiations under the ADP will, among other things, also depend on a 
common understanding of equitable sharing of efforts. While equity is a principle of the 
Convention, its meaning and scope remain contentious. In general terms, equity refers to the 
quality of being impartial, fair and just. In the international climate discourse, equity and 
fairness are used interchangeably.26 The broad understanding is that the new agreement must 
reflect states’ different “situations”, whether they are the stage of development, economic 
means, risk (exposure and vulnerability) of climate impacts, contributions to increasing GHG 
concentrations in the atmosphere – both historical, current and future trends - , technological 
capacities etc. States differ in many regards and these differences must be duly reflected in the 
architecture of the new agreement. 
 
 At the same time, the design of an equitable regime poses a paramount challenge to 
the traditional structure of public international law, which is based on the sovereign equality 
                                           
26 J Ashton and X Wang,  ‘Equity and Climate: In Principle and Practice’ in J.E.Aldy, Beyond Kyoto, Advancing 
the international effort against climate change, Pew Center on Global Climate Change (2003), 62. 
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of states. States are supposed to be treated equally, where as a starting point the same rights 
and duties apply to all. There is, however, growing understanding that in order to treat states 
equally, their differences must be taken into account. Differentiation and positive 
discrimination (e.g. trough affirmative action) is necessary in order to treat different states on 
an equal basis. Traditionally, international law is defined by the sovereign equality of states 
which guarantees that all states have equal rights and obligations. Since the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference, international environmental treaty-making has changed from providing identical 
treatment to all contracting states to providing for differential treatment of developing 
countries, based on concepts of co-operation and solidarity. The idea is to bring about 
effective – rather than formal - equality among de facto unequal states and to ensure the 
participation of all countries in international environmental agreements. 
 
 With the 1992 Rio Declaration a specific form of differential treatment has found its 
way into international environmental law-making. The Declaration’s Principle 7 reads: 
 
“States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore 
the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of different contributions to 
global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility they bear in 
the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their 
societies place on the global environmental and of the technologies and financial 
resources they command.” 
 
 An equitable approach to the climate challenge is often understood as an approach 
based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
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capabilities (CBDRRC) as mentioned in Article 3 UNFCCC, which – different from the Rio 
Declaration – says that:  
 «…parties should act to protect the climate system “on the basis of equity and in 
 accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
 capabilities.”  
 
 This principle has so far mainly been used by major developing countries in the 
context of the Rio Declaration as an argument for demanding from developed countries to 
acknowledge their historic contributions to the increased concentration of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere and act accordingly by “taking the lead” in climate mitigation and finance.27 
The other side of this argument is that developing countries – having historically contributed 
marginally to the current concentrations – should not be required to take on mandatory 
commitments to reduce their GHG emissions. The CBDRRC principle is reflected in the 
“firewall” between developed (Annex-I) and developing (non-Annex) countries and is the 
main reason for the current difficulties to finding a truly equitable solution. 
 
 Differentiation has so far been along the dividing line of “developed” and 
“developing” states and according to historical contributions of developed countries to 
environmental degradation, as well as developed countries capability to engage in cost-
intensive environmental mitigation action. These factors (criteria) have led to substantively 
stronger obligations of developed countries, with developing countries having no or milder 
obligations as well as entitlements to financial transfers as well as transfer of technology and 
know-how from developed countries. Based on these criteria, “positive discrimination” in 
favour of developing countries has led to highly asymmetric environmental obligations 
                                           
27 Arts. 3, 4.2 and 4.7 UNFCCC. 
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coupled with mechanisms for capacity building, transfer of financial resources and technology 
as well as compliance assistance. 
 
 The immense current global challenges all states commonly face can only be tackled 
by taking cooperative large-scale remedial action. However, the factual preconditions under 
which states are acting still differ considerably. Yet, the “landscape of similarities and 
differences” has changed since its perception more than 40 years ago. The world is 
characterized by disparities in resources and capabilities in different ways now. The 
antagonistic dividing line between developed and developing countries is becoming 
increasingly blurred. Any of the two groups, if they can be identified at all28, is no longer 
homogenous but marked by stark internal differences. In addition, the international landscape 
undergoes changes and fluctuations. Any attempt of categorization might be insufficient to 
capture such dynamism. For that reason, there need to be more differentiation29 and 
differentiation should be flexible and dynamic and only be granted on a temporary basis. 
 
 At the time of the conception of the Convention, this “grouping” of states might have 
been a suitable reflection of the state of the world. But 20 years on, it isn’t. Not only have a 
number of developing countries become economies with strong growth, they also have 
increased and partly overtaken to highest emitting developed countries – and trends are 
                                           
28 See, for example, the classification by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in “advanced economies” and 
“emerging market and developing economies”. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 
2012, p. 179. The IMF notes: “This classification is not based on strict criteria, economic or otherwise, and it has 
evolved over time.” p. 177. According to the United Nations Statistics Division,”There is no established 
convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries or areas in the United Nations 
system.” See: UNSD, Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-regions, and 
selected economic and other groupings (fn. C), revised 11 October 2012, available at: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#ftnc. 
29 See also Joost Pauwelyn, The End of Differential Treatment for Developing Countries? Lessons from the 
Trade and Climate Regimes, 22(1) RECIEL 2013, 29-41, who argues for more differentiation and further 
subdivisions. 
18 
 
continuing.30 A differentiation of responsibility to address the climate challenge that rests 
entirely on history contributions is not only not fair – it is not effective. In short, it is 
dangerous, because it will miss out on those emissions that cause global temperatures to tilt 
towards 4 degrees or more. Moreover, the traditional binary differentiation does not address 
the heterogeneity that is found within the group of developing as well as developed countries. 
The question is thus how to reflect the different “situations” of states and their dynamic 
development in the new agreement. The change in the world between 1992 and 2013 tells us 
that such differentiation cannot be static; it needs to be based on dynamic and flexible 
parameters, which allow the structure of the agreement to evolve – as the world evolves. 
 
 When the ADP was adopted in Durban, the decision was free from references to 
developed/developing or Annex-I non-Annex countries. Such wording was celebrated as 
breaking down the traditional firewall between the two major groups. But already the ADP 
decision from Doha, December 2012, has Parties acknowledge that the ADP “shall be guided 
by the principles of the Convention”.31 While attempts to include explicitly the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities or to refer to the climate 
paragraphs of the outcome document of Rio+20 were not successful, the principles of the 
convention are non-negotiable as guiding principles also for the ADP.32  
 
 The argument put forward in this chapter is, that the principles of the convention must 
apply, but they are not static. Their principled character is a means to adjust and adopt the 
convention to changing political circumstances. Principles of law provide a necessary means 
by which law can develop in a dynamic fashion that is responsive to today’s problems. 
                                           
30 See the overview over annual global carbon budgets and trends updated by the Global Carbon Budget, 
available at: http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/index.htm 
31 Decision x/CP.18. 
32 Summary of the Roundtable Under Workstream 1, ADP1, part 2, Doha, Qatar, November-December 2012, 
Note by the Co-Chairs, 7 February 2013 (ADP.2012.6.InformalSummary), at page 2. 
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Principles are ‘an authoritative recognition of a dynamic element on international law’33 Law 
is a continuing process and principles provide for a ‘welcome possibility for growth’34, in 
which capacity they also contribute to the development of international law. Principles are 
never ‘finished products’. It is a ‘continuing process’ from their identification to the final 
determination of the principles’ content in a particular context.35  
 
 While so far, only one particular interpretation of the CBDRRC principle (i.e. 
differentiation based on historic contributions) has dominated the climate negotiations, the 
time has come for more countries to put forward their (evolved) understanding of that 
principle. In Doha, a number of countries came forward with their understanding that the 
CBDRRC principle is reflective of certain dynamism in the climate regime as it is not set in 
stone, but evolves over time. In the on-going ADP negotiations, many Parties therefore 
observed “that the principles [of the Convention] are not rigid, and should be applied in a 
dynamic and evolving manner taking into account national circumstances, changing economic 
realities and levels of development.”36 “Principles…need to be forward-looking and take into 
account what the world might look like in 2020.”37 Some Parties stated that also the 
application of the Convention “should be adapted in order to improve its vitality and 
relevance in the modern world and in order to enable it to become a modern instrument to 
address climate change. It was pointed out that the Convention has evolved, and will continue 
to evolve over time, and thus the manner in which the principles apply also needs to 
evolve.”38 
                                           
33 J L Brierly, (H. Waldock ed.) The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law on Peace 
(Oxford: Clarendon), 1963, 63. 
34 See M Bos, The Recognized Manifestations of International Law, 20 German Yearbook of International Law, 
1977, 42. 
35 Bos, 1977, 42. 
36 Summary of the Roundtable under Workstream 1, ADP1, part 2, Doha, Qatar, November-December 2012, 
Note by the Co-Chairs, 7 February 2013 (ADP.2012.6.InformalSummary) at page 3. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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 Yet, finding reliable, but flexible and dynamic, criteria or means to defining various 
(groups of) “equals” and allocating rights and responsibilities accordingly, may be an 
impossible task in multilateral environmental treaty making. Instead, alternatives to criteria-
based differentiation should be explored. We suggest as such alternatives self-differentiation 
within a spectrum of options. 
 
 As a starting point, the question of how to treat differentially is different from the 
question of how to ‘group’ parties. Traditionally, differentiation has been made along the fault 
line of “developed” and “developing” countries. This antagonistic dividing line is increasingly 
blurred and particularly difficult to maintain in a climate context for some of the fastest 
growing developing countries. Differentiation should thus be flexible and dynamic and only 
be granted on a temporary basis. 
 
 In terms of giving flexibility to differentiations, the 1991 Volatile Organic Compounds 
(VOC) Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP 
VOC Protocol) stands out as an interesting approach. It establishes specific targets and 
timetables which commit Parties to control and reduce their emissions of VOCs. In order, 
however, to reflect the need for differentiation based on a party’s emissions and particular 
geographic and demographic circumstances, the VOC Protocol offers Parties three ways to 
meet the emission reduction requirement. Upon signature or ratification, a Party must chose 
one of these options. While the first option is open to all Parties, the availability of the other 
two options depends on particular criteria and circumstances. 
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 The first option to achieve emission reductions is for (any) Party to “take effective 
measures to reduce its national annual emissions of VOC’s by at least thirty per cent by the 
year 1999, using 1988 levels as a basis or any other annual level during the period 1984 to 
1990, which it may specify upon signature of or accession to the present Protocol.”39 
 
 The second option is only available to a Party whose annual emissions contribute to 
tropospheric ozone concentrations in areas under the jurisdiction of one or more other parties, 
and where such emissions originate only from an area under its jurisdiction that is specified as 
tropospheric ozone management areas (TOMAs) under Annex I to the Protocol. 40 A Party 
that chooses this way shall “as soon as possible and as a first step, take effective measures to: 
(i) Reduce its annual emissions of VOCs from the areas so specified by at least 30 per cent by 
the year 1999, using 1988 levels as a basis or any other annual level during the period 1984-
1990, which it may specify upon signature of or accession to the present Protocol; and (ii)  
ensure that its total national annual emissions of VOCs by the year 1999 do not exceed the 
1988 levels.”41 
 
 The third way is only available to Parties whose national annual emissions of VOCs 
were in 1988 lower than 500,000 tonnes and 20 kg/inhabitant and 5 tonnes/km2. Such a Party 
“shall, as soon as possible and as a first step, take effective measures to ensure at least that at 
the latest by the year 1999 its national annual emissions of VOCs do not exceed the 1988 
levels.»42 
                                           
39 Art. 2(2)(a) VOC Protocol. This option has been chosen by Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom with 1988 as base year, by Denmark 
with 1985, by Liechtenstein, Switzerland and the United States with 1984, and by Czech Republic, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Monaco and Slovakia with 1990 as base year). 
40 Art. 2(2)(b) VOC Protocol. Annex I specifies TOMAs in Norway (base year 1989) and Canada (base year 
1988). The total Norwegian mainland as well as the exclusive economic zone south of 62°N latitude in the 
region of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), covering an area of 466,000 km2, is a TOMA. 
41 Art. 2(2)(b) VOC Protocol. This has been chosen by Bulgaria, Greece, and Hungary.  
42 Art. 2(2)(c) VOC Protocol. 
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 Furthermore, no later than two years after the protocol entered into force each party 
was required to apply appropriate (!) national or international emission standards to new 
stationary and new mobile sources based on “best available technologies which are 
economically feasible” (BATEF). No later than 5 years after the entry into force, in those 
areas in which national or international tropospheric ozone standards are exceeded or where 
transboundary fluxes originate or are expected to originate, each Party must apply BATEF to 
existing stationary sources in major categories.43 
 
 In carrying out their obligations, Parties are invited to give highest priority to 
reduction and control of emissions of the substances with the greatest photochemical ozone 
creation potential. Innovative is further the requirement that states must ensure that they do 
not substitute toxic and carcinogenic VOCs, and those that harm the stratospheric ozone layer, 
for other VOCs.44 
 
 The success of the LRTAR is partly due to its restricted regional scope and its 
comparatively small and homogenous group of Parties. It has nevertheless served as a model 
for the UNFCCC and the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer.  
 
 One lesson from the VOC Protocol for the climate negotiations is that by giving 
Parties the (free) choice of option based on certain criteria for availability of that particular 
option – or no criteria – the Parties themselves can find their ‘group’ in some form of “self-
differentiation”. As, for example, option three of the VOC Protocol illustrates, certain 
                                           
43 Art. 3 VOCs Protocol. 
44 Art. 5 VOC Protocol. 
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emission intensity criteria (e.g. t/capita or t/km2) or overall emission amounts or other 
economic, demographic and/or geographic criteria can be included in the design of options. 
 
 In addition, the options could differ either in substance (higher baselines or different 
base years or reference levels, higher emissions caps or less stringent targets) or in form 
(flexibility for implementation, supplementarity, time frame for implementation etc.) or in 
both. For example, some options might be equal in substance, but differ in the timeframe for 
implementation periods (so-called grace periods as in the Montreal Protocol). Moreover, some 
options could be linked to either providing or receiving financial, technology and scientific 
support and assistance. This could be fine-tuned with the particular design of the various 
options. One example could be the choice between two particular options, where one includes 
stronger emission reduction targets but weaker obligations to provide financial support, 
whereas the other option contains the opposite: more moderate emission reduction targets 
coupled with significant financial transfer obligations. Such an ‘optioning’ approach coupled 
with criteria for the availability of particular options by otherwise free choice could open for 
much needed flexibility in the design of new international environmental agreements, climate 
change in particular. 
 
 While the optioning-approach could be a feasible way forward it is important to keep 
the architecture dynamic. Dynamic elements should thus be integrated into the options or 
complement them (see VOC Protocol, Art. 3). Dynamic elements in terms of technological 
responses are, for example, the requirement of using “best available technologies” or “best 
practices”. Dynamism in terms of substance can also be maintained by (i) adopting a “critical 
loads” approach which allow for upward adjustments (ii) regular review of the 
appropriateness of the targets in the light of latest scientific findings, (iii) by automatic 
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strengthening of commitments in given intervals, adjustments on the basis of available 
scientific, environmental, technical and economic information (see art. 6 Montreal Protocol) 
(iv) or by review of the level of ambition by an assessment expert panel.  
 
 The point is that there will not be one type of differentiation that “fits all” and covers 
all the very different circumstances and situations in country Parties. It will be the right 
combination or “mix” of substantive commitments, incentive structures, entitlements, 
procedural requirements etc. which will be crucial for the success of a new agreement. A 
well-designed and fine-tune “catalogue” of options (with differing commitments and/or 
entitlements) which Parties can chose from upon signature or ratification might be a feasible 
way forward, reflecting the diversities of a globalized and interconnected world in the 
sophisticated design of a comprehensive agreement. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The negotiations of the new climate agreement face challenges both regarding its legal form 
and its principles. The Durban Platform establishes a framework by the requirement that the 
agreement shall be ‘a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force 
under the Convention applicable to all parties’. While the formulation is marked by 
‘constructive ambiguity’, it provides guidance and allows states to choose between the 
distinctive options of adopting a new protocol, amendments to the UNFCCC (or annexes or 
amendments to annexes), or a package including delegation of powers to the COP to adopt 
legally binding decisions.  
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 But the future climate agreement raises also the question about the legally binding 
character of each of its elements. This should be decided on the basis of the international legal 
consequences of choosing a legally binding form of the relevant element, i.e. a functional 
approach. It would generally seem that the stringency and complexity required of a new 
agreement would militate in favour of legally binding elements. However, the need for a 
dynamic regime suggests that extensive decision-making power should be delegated to the 
COP. 
 
 It is also necessary to rethink the relationship between the sovereign equality of states 
and the meaning of equity in light of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC). The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
make a sharp distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I states. But the economy of and 
emissions from different states have become so heterogeneous that it is no longer desirable to 
uphold this binary character of states. There is a need for more differentiation, flexibility and 
dynamism. This could include the possibility that states choose between different options of 
substantive commitments (“self-differentiation”), incentive structures, etc., combined with 
dynamic criteria, such as using “best available technology”, or a “critical loads” approach 
which allows for upward adjustment of commitments.  
 
 Such an approach would be less prescriptive than a (unrealistic) top-down structure 
but more ambitious than mere bottom-up approaches, while leaving necessary freedom and 
flexibility to the Parties. 
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